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During the past thirty years, and especially in the last decade, there
has been widespread discussion of that function of the Courts which
has been concisely termed "judicial review," embracing their general
authority to pass upon the constitutionality of State statutes and of Acts
of Congress. In this discussion, there has frequently been too little
appreciation of the fact that the power of the United States Supreme
Court and of inferior Federal Courts to determine whether the action of
a State Legislature has been inconsistent with the provisions of the
Federal Constitution, and the power to set aside the action of a co6rdi-
nate branch of the Federal Government are separate and distinct
powers, proceeding from separate and distinct sources in the Constitu-
tion, and supportable on separate and distinct grounds. The one may
be firmly established, without controverting in any way the arguments
of those who challenge or deplore the other. Both jurists and the
historians agree that the existence of the former power has been abso-
lutely necessary for the preservation of the supremacy of the Federal
Government; while, on the other hand, it is possible that the Federal
Government might have functioned (though in somewhat lame
manner), without the exercise of the latter power by the Courts.'
In spite of its firm legal foundation, nevertheless, the exercise of judi-
cial review by the United States Courts with reference to State statutes
was the subject of heated attack by the adherents of State-Rights, for a
long period of years, and especially from 1816 to 1858. This opposi-
tion, however, did not arise until the lapse of twenty-five years from the
date of the institution of the Federal judicial system.2  Hitherto, legal
writers have very generally asserted that the earliest instance of a
Federal Court decision holding a State statute invalid was Van Horne's
Lessee v. Dorrance,3 in 1795, by Judge William Paterson, sitting in the
United States Circuit Court in Pennsylvania. From an examination of
the newspapers of the last decade of the eighteenth century, however,
made by the author of this article in the course of a study of the history
of the Federal Judiciary, it appears that three years before the Dorrance
Case, and as early as 1792, a United States Circuit Court in Rhode
Island held a statute of that State invalid, as an impairment of obligation
of contract, and the question of the validity of the Rhode Island legal-
' See address before the Harvard Law School Association, Feb. 15, 1913, Speeches
of Oliver Wendell Holmes (913): "The United States would not come to an end
if we lost our power to declare an Act of Congress void.... I do think the Union
would be imperilled if we could not make that declaration as to the laws of the
several States."
- Charles Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History (1922).
32 Dall. 304.
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tender laws was also involved in cases in the same Court in 1791 and
1792. Moreover, this exercise of judicial review passed unchallenged
in the very State which, only five years before, had attempted to remove
its State Court Judges for holding a State law unconstitutional, in the
famous case of Trevett v. Weeden.3a It is interesting, therefore, to
examine more closely the conditions under which this first case arose,
in 1792.
The Revolutionary War was, in general, a period of prosperity for the
merchants of Rhode Island, but of adversity and increase of debt for the
farming and the land-owning classes and for the State itself. At the
end of the war, "there was little money in the country, the lands and
stock of the farmers were being seized and sold at forced sale at a great
loss, silver could not be hired on the best security and distress was every-
where." 4 Litigation arose on all sides, and the lawyers thrived. The
paper money which had been issued by the State during the War had
depreciated so rapidly that, in October, 1781, it was declared by the
Legislature no longer legal tender in payment of taxes or of debts to the
State. For five years, conditions grew steadily worse. Finally, in
May, 1786, the Legislature, at the instance of the farmers and over the
protest of the deputies from the commercial city of Providence, enacted
a radical statute, which provided as follows:
"Whereas from a variety of causes, political and mercantile, the
currency of this State now in circulation has become altogether insuffi-
cient in point of quantity for the purposes of trade and commerce, and
for paying the just debts of the inhabitants thereof ; therefore to estab-
lish a circulating medium'upon the firmest and most equitable princi-
ples that may be, and for facilitating this interchange of property, so
essential to a commercial State and a people circumstanced as are the
inhabitants of this State, be it enacted .... that One Hundred Thousand
Pounds, lawful money, be forthwith emitted in bills of paper and
loaned on the credit of clear landed real estates double the value of the
said bills so loaned to be pledged on such real estate."
It further provided that the bills when emitted should be accepted on
a par with silver and gold, estimating an ounce of coined silver at six
shillings and eight pence, and should "be a. good and lawful tender for
the complete payment and final discharge of all debts now due and
contracted and that may hereafter become due and be contracted and
for the final and full discharge of all fines and forfeitures, judgments
and executions, now had, become due and recovered, of every and any
nature and kind whatsoever within this State"; and that, in case of the
refusal of a creditor to take these bills in payment, the debtor might
apply to a Judge of the Superior Court for a citation, and might lodge
the amount of his debt with the Judge, who should give a certificate,
said lodgment to be deemed a sufficient tender for every purpose
,a (1786, R. I.) 2 Chandler, Ai. Criminal Trials, 269.
'See in general Frank Greene Bates, Rhode Island and the Formation of the
Union (1898) lO7 et seq., 124 et seq.; United States Chronicle (Prov.) May ii,
1786; William R. Staples, Annals of the Town of Providence (1843)' 294 et seq.
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mentioned in the Act; and that the Judge, in case of continued refusal
of the creditor to accept the bills lodged in his hands, should, at the
expiration of three months, deposit them in the General Treasury. At
the same session of the Legislature in May, 1786, another statute was
passed, of an even more stringent nature, providing that debts due to
certain corporations should not be paid by the debtors unless sued there-
for, and then be paid only in legal tender :5
"Whereas there are divers corporate bodies within this State, which
have been incorporated for beneficial, charitable and religious uses who
are possessed of funds for carrying the same into execution, who have
lent their money upon a moderate interest to those that have had occa-
sion to borrow, and do not wish to receive the same, unless their institu-
tions have a use for it,-It is therefore voted and resolved, that gold,
silver, or any other species of money shall not be tendered unto any such
corporate body in discharge of money lent or due, unless the person or
persons who borrowed or owe the same be sued, in which case any
money being a legal tender shall discharge the debt, in the same manner
as debts are to be discharged between individuals."
As soon as these statutes were enacted, the value of the paper money
rapidly declined; creditors declined to receive it; merchants declined.
to sell goods for payment in paper, and trade practically ceased. 6 It
soon became evident that, to enforce the laws, it was necessary to put
teeth in them; and accordingly, in June, 1786, another statute was
passed, imposing a fine of one hundred pounds upon any man refusing
to accept the paper bills in payment of a debt, or making a distinction
in value between them and specie, and for a second offence a fine and
incapacity to vote or hold office.7 The reasons for this Act were
quaintly set 'forth in a recital clause as follows:
"Whereas it is highly necessary and of the last and most important
consequence to the government of all States, that the proceedings of the
Legislature be held in high estimation, and the most sacred regard; and
that the law when promulgated be strictly adhered to, and punctually
and most religiously obeyed. And whereas it is of the greatest moment,
that the aforesaid emission of One Hundred Thousand Pounds, which
will have the greatest tendency of anything within the wisdom of this
Legislature to quiet the minds and to alleviate the distressed situation
and circumstances of the good citizens of this State, should be kept in
'Records of the State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations in New
England (1865) X, r99.
'Frank Greene Bates, op. cit. 124-125; United States Chronicle, July 6, i3, 1786.
" See The Case, Trevett against Weeden on information and Complaint, for
refusing Paper Bills in payment for Butcher's Meat in Market, at Par with
Specie, Tried before the Honorable Superior Court in the County of Newport,
September Term 1786, also The Case of the Judges of said Court, before the
Honorable General Assembly, at Providence, October Session, 1786, on Citation,
for Dismissing said Complaint, Wherein the Rights of the People to Trial by
Jury, etc., are stated and maintained, and the Legislative, Judiciary and Executive
Powers of Government Examined and Defined, by James M. Varnum, Esq., Major-
General of the State of Rhode Island, etc., Counsellor at Law, and Member of
Congress for said State (Providence; Printed by John Carter, 1787), at page 57.
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good credit; and that the same should be a currency equal in value to
coined gold and silver; And Whereas various attempts have been made
by a certain class of men, who, from mistaken principles, suppose the
said currency to be injurious to their interest, and from an inclination to
render invalid such laws and regulations of this Assembly, as may not
quadrate with their interest, judgment and opinion of things, and for
many other causes, which, if permitted to exist, will support a power in
this State counter to the authority chosen and appointed by the suffrages
of the free people thereof, and subversive of these laws and principles
upon which the happiness, welfare and safety, of the people depends."
Two months later, still further legislation was found necessafy, and
at a specially called session of the General Assembly, the Act of
August 22, 1786 was passed, the preamble of which recited:
"Whereas, it is an established maxim in legislation, and ought to be
strictly and most punctually adhered to in all wise governments, that
process upon the breach of penal laws be immediate, and the penalty be
inflicted or exacted directly consequent upon conviction; and whereas,
the usual and stated methods and times of holding Courts within this
State are impracticable, inexpedient and inapplicable to the true intent
and meaning of the said Act, and altogether insufficient to carry into
effect the good purposes of this Legislature touching the same."
The Act itself provided that in case of violation of the previous
statutes, an information might be issued by a Judge.of the Supreme
Court of Judicature or of the inferior Court of Common Pleas and that
a trial might be had before a Court of at least three Judges without a
jury and without appeal, the Court to be convened within three days, and
in said process "no essoin, protection privilege or injunction shall be in
any wise prayed, granted or allowed." By another Act in August, 1786,
the Legislature even went so far as to make the paper money legal tender
in payment of. Continental taxes.
A period of absolute commercial stagnation ensued. Merchants
closed their stores, and it was with difficulty that provisions could be
obtained; many people removed from the State; few farmers from the
neighboring States could be induced to bring their produce into Rhode
Island.8 The scale of depreciation of the paper money as fixed by the
General Assembly was as follows: in July, 1786, 6 shillings in specie to
9 in bills; in October, 1786, 6 to 18; in January, 1787, 6 to 24; in
April, 1787, 6 to 34.
Meanwhile the validity of the Act of August 22, 1786, authorizing
trial before three Judges specially convened and sitting without a jury
was challenged, within a month after its passage, in one of the historic
cases in American legal annals. This was an information brought by
one John Trevett against John Weeden, a butcher, before Paul
Mumford, Chief Justice of the Superior Court, for refusing to accept
paper money in payment for meat sold in his market. The Chief
Justice caused a special Court to be convened under the statute; but as
8 Frank Greene Bates, op. cit. 125; Providence Gazette, July 8, 22, Aug. 5, 12,
Sept. 3o, Oct. 7, 1786.
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the Superior Court was then sitting in its regular term in Newport in
September, 1786, the information was "referred into the term, for
consideration and final determination, by the Superior Court of Judica-
ture, Court of Assizes and General Gaol Delivery."
9
On September 25, 1786, the case was argued for the plaintiff by
Henry Goodwin, and for the defendant by General James Mitchell
Varnum and Henry Marchant, who appeared at the instance of those
interested in the issue (Weeden being excessively poor and unable to
pay counsel). The counsel for the defence contended with vigor that
the statute was absolutely invalid because of the lack of any provision
for trial by jury, and because of its requirement of discharge of debts
by forced acceptance of depreciated paper. As to the power of the
Court to disregard an invalid legislative act, Varnum argued impres-
sively, saying that he was not "capable of distinguishing between an
established tyranny and that government where the Legislative makes
the law and dictates to the Judges their adjudication." "Have the
Judges a power to repeal, to amend, to alter laws, or to make new
laws?" he asked. "God forbid! In that case, they would become
Legislators. Have the Legislators power to direct the Judges how they
shall determine upon the laws already made? God forbid! In that
case they would become Judges. The true distinction lies in this, that
the Legislative have the incontrollable power of making laws not
repugnant to the Constitution; the Judiciary have the sole power of
judging of those laws, and are bound to execute them, but cannot admit
any act of the Legislative as law, which is against the Constitution."
The day after the argument, the decision of the Court was rendered
by Judge Howell, declaring "that the information was not cognizable
before them," and that the penal law was "repugnant and unconsti-
tutional." "No reasons are given for the decision," said the local
newspaper.' 0
The consequences of the decision were immediately felt, wrote
Varnum in his pamphlet account (published in 1787): "The shops and
stores were generally opened, and business assumed a cheerful aspect.
Few were the exceptions to a general congratulation, and lavish indeed
were the praises bestowed upon the Court. The dread and the idea of
informations were banished together, while a most perfect confidence
'Rhode Island Historical Tracts (188o) No. 8. Some Account of the Bills of
Credit or Paper Money in Rhode Island, 117 et seq.
" History of the State of Rhode Island (i86o) by Samuel Greene Arnold, II, 525
et seq.; State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations at the End of the
Century (19o2) by Edward Field, III, Chap. 2. "The struggle for Judicial
Supremacy," Newport Mercury, Oct. 2, 1786; see Gleanings from the Judicial
History of Rhode Island (1883) by Thomas Durfee, R. I. Hist. Tracts XVIII,
52. See also Irving Bedine Richman, Rhode Island a Study in Separation (19o5)
80-83, contending that the decision was one of jurisdiction only and not of consti-
tutional law; Charles B. Elliott, The Legislatures and the Courts in Pol. Sci. Qu.
(18go) 224, 233 et seq. See contra references cited in footnote 9 at p. 233 of
the article by Elliott.
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was placed in judicial security. The paper currency obtained a more
extensive circulation, as everyone found himself at liberty to receive or
refuse it. The markets which had been illy supplied, were now amply
furnished, and the spirit of industry was generally diffused. Every
prospect teemed with returning happiness and nothing appeared wanting
to restore union and harmony among the contending parties. The
demon, however, of discord was not entirely subdued; for upon the next
succeeding week a summons was issued from the Rhode Island
Assembly requiring an immediate attendance of the Judges before it,"
as follows :1
"Whereas it appears that the honorable the justices of the Superior
Court of Judicature, Court of Assize, etc., at the last September Term
of the said Court, in the County of Newport, have by a judgment of the
said Court declared and adjudged an Act of the Supreme Legislature of
this State to be unconstitutional, and so absolutely void; and whereas
it is suggested that the aforesaid judgment is unprecedented in this
State, and may tend directly to abolish the legislative authority
thereof,--it is therefore voted and resolved that all the justices of the
said Court be forthwith cited by the sheriffs of the respective counties
in which they live, or may be found, to assign the reasons and grounds
of the aforesaid judgment, and that the Clerk of the said Court be
directed to attend this Assembly at the same time, with the records of
the said Court which relate to the said judgment."
In compliance with the summons of the Assembly, three of the
Judges of the Superior Court appeared, the other two being unwell.
The Assembly dismissed them at that time, but directed them to appear
at the October session, at which, on October 30, 1786, the three Judges
(Hazard, Tillinghast, and Howell) attended and gave notice in writing
to both Houses "that they waited their pleasure." Each Judge also
submitted a statement of the reasong for his decision, and, as Varnum
wrote: "Mr. Howell, the youngest Justice addressed himself to the
Assembly in a very learned, sensible and elaborate discourse, in which he
was upwards of six hours on the floor. . ". To the observations of the
Judges, succeeded a very serious and interesting debate among the
members, wherein many arguments and observations were adduced on
both sides. At length a question was taken, 'whether the Assembly
was satisfied with the reasons given by the Judges in support of their
judgment.' It was determined in the negative. A motion was then
made, and seconded, 'for dismissing the Judges from their office.'
This was coming to the point, for the obtaining of which the greatest
exertions had been made. . . . Upon a question of so unprecedented
and so interesting a nature, many of the leading gentlemen of the
'Records of the State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantation, X. See
Frank Greene Bates, op. cit. 134-139. "The decision was hailed with joy in Provi-
dence and Newport Business at once awoke, and for a short time paper circu-
lated freely. .... But on the part of the defeated party momentary dismay was
turned to wrath against the Superior Court. The Assembly, the willing instrument
of the paper money policy, was called into service."
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Administration seemed almost ready to yield the ground upon which
they had contended. Some were for displacing the Judges at all events;
some were for saving appearances by drawing out a concession on the
part of the Court, and others were determined fully to justify them."
At this juncture and during the debate, the Judges, on November 4,
1786, presented a memorial demanding a hearing on "certain and
specific charges" "before some proper and legal tribunal."' 2 Finally,
the Assembly decided that, as no accusation against the Judges was
formally before it, the only question for its decision was whether they
should be discharged from any further attendance upon it; and it voted
as follows :13
"The said three Judges being fully heard before the Assembly, it is
voted and resolved, that no satisfactory reasons have been rendered by
them for their judgment on the foregoing information .... and that as
the Judges of the Superior Court are not charged with criminality in
giving judgment upon the information they are discharged from any
further attendance upon this Assembly on that account."
Meanwhile, it was evident even to their advocates that the legal tender
laws were rapidly becoming unenforceable in a practical operation. A
proposition of the Assembly to require every citizen to take a test oath
to make every endeavor that paper money should have an equal value
with specie and to sell or expose for sale no article for which he would
not accept in payment either paper or gold at the same rate (all office-
holders, lawyers and persons entering or clearing vessels to be obliged
to subscribe to the oath under severe penalties), was rejected in October,
1786, on a referendum to the voters in town meetings assembled.14
On January 6, 1787, the Act of June, 1786, containing the provisions for
fines and penalties was repealed by the Assembly; and the original Act
of May, 1786, was rendered practically inoperative by the Courts, when
the Superior Court adjourned its March Term in 1787, for three weeks,
on the ground that the depreciation of paper made the administration of
justice impossible. "At the April Term in Washington County, more
than twenty bills in equity were heard for the redemption of mortgages
of estates. The paper for redeeming these estates was brought into
Court by the sackful. Determined not to make a farce of justice, the
Judges refused to record these tenders and put over all such cases until
the next Term."' 5
' The copy of the printed report of this case of Trevett v. Weeden which
belonged to David Howell is in the Library of Congress; and in Howell's hand-
writing, it is stated that this memorial was written by him.
See Providence Gazette, Nov. Ni, I786.
"United States Chronicle, Oct. 12, 1786; Providence Gazette, Oct. 14, 1788;
Frank Greene Bates, op. cit. 139-141; yet while paper money (which had then
fallen from 9 to 6 to 24 to 6) was not in fact accepted in transactions between
individuals, the Assembly by Act of January 6, 1787, took the extraordinary step
of enacting that payment of the State debt might be made in paper to the extent
of one quarter. Samuel Greene Arnold, History of the State of Rhode Island
(186o) 529-535.
'Frank Greene Bates, op. cit. 143-144; Samuel Greene Arnold, op. cit. 535.
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One last effort, however, was made by the paper-money party to
bolster up their pet legislation. They had tried new stringent enforce-
ment laws and finding them useless had repealed them. They now
tried a new set of Judges. As, at this time, the Judiciary were chosen
annually by the Assembly, the next Assembly, controlled by the farmers,
on May 2, 1787, rejected for reappointment four of the five Judges who
had participated in the decision of Trevett v. Woeden, the Chief Justice,
Paul Mumford, alone being re-elected.
But neither success in the spring election nor the displacement of
obnoxious Judges brought any improvement in business conditions.
Economic law was stronger than popular vote or judicial decision. The
value of the paper money continued to fall, from 34 to 6 in April, 1787,
it dropped to 38 to 6 in April, 1788; to 45 to 6 in July, 1788; to 6o to 6
in January, 1789; and to 90 to 6 in July, 1789.16 Towards the end of
the third year of this kind of experience, there was a political reaction in
the State.
In March, 1789, a motion in the Assembly to repeal the tender law of
May, 1786, was lost by a vote of 19 to 27, and in June, a similar
motion was lost by a vote of 20 to 30; but in September, 1789, the
Assembly, admitting that great injustice would result from the awful
depreciation unless some action should be taken, suspended the Act
until the next Session. Finally, on October 12, 1789, the Act was
repealed, though, with the proviso, as a sop to the debtor class, that
debtors might substitute property at an appraised value for money in
discharge of their liabilities, and that the time allowed for redemption of
mortgaged estates should be extended from five to twelve years.1 7  As
a factor in bringing about this decision, it may be noted that other States
had begun to retaliate against Rhode Island for the wrongs caused by its
paper-money legislation, and Connecticut actually excluded citizens of
Rhode Island from its Courts. 8
Meanwhile, the paper money issue had become somewhat involved
with the issue of State-Rights and the agitation for strengthening the
powers of the Federal Congress and for adopting a new Federal Con-
stitution. The State of Rhode Island was dividing politically on these
lines. Roughly speaking, the farmers, the inhabitants of country towns,
and the paper-money men became Anti-Federalists; the merchants and
the citizens of Providence and Newport became Federalists. The
Anti-Federalist attitude of the State and its failure to ratify the Consti-
tution were largely due to its fears as to the operation of that clause
which prohibited a State from impairing the obligation of contracts.
"6 These figures were official, according to the scale of depreciation fixed by the
General Assembly.
' Samuel Greene Arnold, op. cit. 557. In February, 1793, the State began to
destroy by burning such paper money as it had accumulated from payment of
taxes, and up to May, 18o3, 96,646 pounds were destroyed. As late as i8ig paper
was received in payment of taxes to the States at the rate of 90 to 6. Rhode
Island Hist. Tracts (1880) No. 8, op. cit. 117 et seq.
' Providence Gazette, Feb. 28, 1789; Frank Greene Bates, op. cit. 185.
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If that provision should be held applicable to State statutes enacted
before the adoption of the Constitution, then it was clear that the legal-
tender laws of Rhode Island would be declared unconstitutional by the
Federal Courts (as they had been by the State Judges in Trevett v.
Weeden) and Rhode Island was unwilling to take this risk.'
9  The
repeal of its legal-tender law, however, on October 12, 1789, rendered
this reason for refusal to join the Union less potent. But even when
the State finally ratified the Constitution, on May 29, 179
o , by the close
vote of 34 to 32, it still attempted to guard itself against Federal inter-
ference with its legislation, by proposing an Amendment to the Consti-
tution to the effect that the jurisdiction of the United States Courts
should not extend to criminal prosecution by a State or to suits by any
individual against a State, and that Congress should not, "directly or
indirectly, either by themselves or through the Judiciary interfere with
any one of the States in the redemption of paper money already emitted
and now in circulation or in liquidating or discharging the public
securities of any one State and that every State shall have the exclusive
right of making such laws and regulations for the before mentioned
purposes as they shall think proper."
Only a year after Rhode Island entered the Union, the issue which it
had apprehended arose in a case in the United States Circuit Court for
the District of Rhode Island, tried and decided in June, i79i, involving,
(amongst other questions), the constitutionality of its legal-tender laws
of May and August, 1786. The case was an ejectment proceeding
brought April 30, 1791, by David Leonard Barnes, of Taunton, in the
State of Massachusetts, and Joseph Jenckes and others, of Providence,
in the State of Rhode Island, against William West, of Scituate, in the
State of Rhode Island. The facts appearing in the records were as fol-
lows: West had made a mortgage of land in 1763 for one year for the
payment of 2,174 dollars; no foreclosure having taken place, on Sep-
tember 12, 1789, he tendered payment of the amount due then, viz., 1,593
pounds, to the owner of the mortgage; the tender, made in paper money,
under the Act of May, 1786, was refused by the mortgagee; whereupon,
West, following the procedure prescribed by the Act of August, 1786,
lodged the money with a Judge of the Superior Court, who issued a cita-
tion to the mortgagee to appear within ten days from service (as directed
by the statute) ; this citation was served on September 17; the mortgagee
"In Cooper v. Teifair (1800) 4 DalU. 14, Judge Chase raised the question
whether the provision of the Federal Constitution relative to State bills of
attainder applied to such bills enacted prior to 1789. In concurring with the
Court in sustaining Georgia statutes of 1782 and 1787, he said: "There is likewise
a material difference between laws passed by the individual States during the
Revolution, and laws passed subsequently to the organization of the Federal Con-
stitution. Few of the Revolutionary acts would stand the rigorous tests now
applied.... Whether the power (i. e. the power to declare acts invalid) under the
existing Constitution can be employed to invalidate acts previously enacted is a
very different question turning upon very different principles, and with respect to
which I abstain from giving an opinion."
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failing to appear, the Judge on September 28, issued to West, the mort-
gagor, a certificate of compliance with the statute and a discharge of his
debt. West, in defending the ejectment suit, supported his title to the
mortgaged premises by a plea in bar setting up the above facts, and
pleading payment of the mortgage, by virtue of his compliance with the
statute under which he claimed "to have legally paid and satisfied and
discharged the principal and interest."2
The Court (consisting of Chief Justice Jay, Justice William Cushing,
and District Judge Henry Marchant) decided broadly that the plea in
bar was bad, without specifying any grounds for its decision as
follows :21
"Whereupon all and singular the premises being seen and by the Court
here fully understood, and mature deliberation being thereon had, it
seems to the Court now here, that the plea in Bar of the said William
West aforesaid is bad and insufficient in Law to preclude the plaintiffs
from having their action aforesaid thereof against the said William
West. Therefore it is considered, that the plaintiffs recover and have
their seizin against the said William West of the said Farm or Tract of
land with the appurtenances, and also their costs, taxed at Fourteen
dollars, and eighteen cents."
The contemporary newspapers though making no reference to this
particular case, stated that: "The Court, in the conduct of the business
and in their decisions, gave great satisfaction. Their candour, impar-
tiality and discernment were universally acknowledged and applauded.
Justice itself seemed to preside on the bench and inspire it.''22 It is
evident, therefore, that this decision in Barnes v. West, though adverse
to a debtor claiming under the State legal-tender law, caused no popular
excitement or criticism, at the time. It may be that this was due to the
fact that the Federal Court did not pass upon the constitutional question
involved. The State Courts, themselves, however, were now freely
holding that the Act of October 12, 1789, authorizing payment by a
debtor in property at an appraised value, and similar laws were invalid,
It is interesting to note that the Federal Circuit Court might well have
decided the case on a point of jurisdiction; for inasmuch as the case was brought
in that Court on the ground of diverse citizenship, it appeared on the face of the
record that some of the plaintiffs were citizens of the same State as the defendant,
and therefore under the law (as settled by later decisions of the Supreme Court)
the Court had no jurisdiction. The point apparently was not raised.
' See original records now in the files of the District Court of the United
States for the District of Rhode Island-Barnes et al. v. William West et al., June
Term, 1791, United States Circuit Court, District of Rhode Island.
Boston Gazette, July 4, 1791 ; Massachusetts Spy, July 14, 1791. The Colun-
bian Centinel (Boston) June 29, 1791, stated that on June 23 the Circuit Court
adjourned "after a session of fifteen days during which a variety of civil causes
were heard and determined."
James' Iredell, a Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, wrote to
Rev. A. Iredell, November 30, 1792: "The people are strongly and zealously
attached to the government of the United States; even Rhode Island itself, which
State, I am told, has been principally brought over to a degree of content by the
decisions and manner of doing business of the Courts of the United States, is in
24 .
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and these decisions aroused no opposition. 23  Moreover-a fact still
more remarkable-the State Legislature itself substantially acquiesced
in the right of the Judiciary to hold its statutes invalid; for at the very
time of the decision by the Federal Court in Barnes v. West, the Legisla-
ture took the following action on a State Court decision (as described
by a Providence newspaper) : "An action at a special Court having been
commenced in the County of Bristol against the Sheriff of the County
of Providence for having received the paper money of this State at the
rate of fifteen for one, agreeably to the Act passed before the adoption
of the National Constitution called the Substitute Act, wherein judg-
ment was given by the unanimous opinion of the Court against the
Sheriff on the principle that by the adoption of the Constitution that Act
was virtually repealed, a petition was therefore presented for the inter-
position of the Legislature; but as the House of Representatives
refused to receive the petition, it must be inferred as the sense of the
Legislature that the Act before mentioned was superseded, by the adop-
tion of the Constitution and that it has thereby become null and void,
consequently nothing but silver and gold can now be a Tender in this
State on judgments obtained for money."
'24
This acquiescence by the Legislature in the legal proposition that a
State law, enacted prior to the adoption of the Constitution, of a nature
forbidden to a State by the provisions of the Constitution was to be
considered invalidated, is a striking illustration of the complete submis-
sion of the State to the Federal authority, within only fourteen months
after its tardy ratification of the Constitution.
Two months later, it seemed likely that the question of the constitu-
tional validity of the State legal tender law would be passed upon by
the Supreme Court of the United States; for the case of West v. Barnes
had been taken up to that Court on writ of error, and was on its docket
at the Term held in August, 1791. But, on being called for argument
on the second day of the Term, David L. Barnes of Massachusetts, one
of the defendants in error and Counsellor of the Court (just admitted)
rose and stated to the Court that the proceedings in the above cause
could not be properly before the Court, the writ of error having issued
from the office of the Clerk of the Circuit Court and not from the office
of the Clerk of the Supreme Court.25 On this point of procedure, the
every respect infinitely better than it was." Griffith J. McRee, Life and Corre-
spondence of lavies Iredell (1858).
See Providence Gazette, June 25, 1791: "The Court of Common Pleas in the
County of Washington at a late Term, gave their unanimous judgment that noth-
ing but silver or gold is a tender to discharge execution. The same judgment has
also been given at a late special Court of Common Pleas in the County of Bristol
on the same question. In consequence of which it is said, that no Sheriff in the
State presumes to receive anything but hard money in discharge of executions."
24Providence Gazette, July 9, 1791.
" See account given in Dunlap's Anierican Daily Advertiser, Aug. 13, 1791;
Columbia); Centinel, Aug. 13, 1791; Massachusetts Spy, Aug. 25, 1790; this
account is fuller than that given in 2 Dall. 4Ol.
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Court dismissed the writ of error. Had it not been for this technical
blunder, it is probable that the very first case to be argued before that
Court would have presented the delicate issue of the Court's power to
declare the invalidity of a State statute.
On November 9, 1791, two months after the decision of the Supreme
Court, Barnes brought another suit in ejectment in the Circuit Court
for the District of Rhode Island, against West and several additional
defendants, based on the same mortgage as the previous suit. West
set up the same plea of payment. The Court (composed again of Chief
Justice Jay, Justice William Cushing, and District Judge Henry
Marchant), in June, 1792; for a second time held the plea bad. It
appears from-an account in a contemporary newspaper that though
many other points were involved in the case (including undoubtedly the
question of the constitutionality of the law), the Court did not pass
upon them. The Providence Gazette described the decision as follows:
"In the cause of Barnes and others against West and others upon a
mortgage, the Circuit Court at Newport gave their opinions on Wednes-
day last (June 13) unanimously in favour of the plaintiffs. They, how-
ever, decided one point only. In this case, the money was lodged with
the Justice on the i6th of September and the operation of the emitting
Act as it is called was suspended on the 19 th of the same month. The
Court were therefore clearly of opinion that, as the person to whom the
money was tendered was to have ten days to receive it of the Justice,
and as three days only elapsed before the Justice's power to keep the
money or pay it to the creditor expired, the tender was not made con-
formable to the statute and therefore could have no effect. They did not
give any opinion on many other points that were made in the case and
which will probably come up in divers other causes now pending respect-




But while the United States Circuit Court did not pass upon the con-
stitutional question as to impairment of obligation of contract in this
case, another case which had been argued at this same June, 1792, Term,
presented the question in connection with another statute; and in this
latter case, Alexander Champion and Thomas Dickason v. Silas Casey
(which appears to have been hitherto unnoted by legal historians) the
Federal Judiciary, for the first time in its history, proceeded to hold a
State statute invalid. The law involved was a resolve of the General
Assembly, passed in February, 1791, in response to a petition of a debtor
for an extension of three years' time in which to settle his accounts with
his creditors and for an exemption from all arrests and attachments for
such term of three years.lr
"Providence Gazette, June 16, 1792; United States Chronicle (Prov.) June 14,
1792; Salem Gazette, June 26, 1792.
"The petitioner, Silas Casey, represented as follows: "Your petitioner from
repeated heavy losses at sea, and other unexpected disappointments in a long
course of very extensive mercantile transactions finds his affairs extremely
embarassed, and himself unable to do that justice to his creditors which his former
prompt payments gave them reason to expect, he hath for some time past been
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF STATE LEGISLATION
In this suit, brought in the Federal Court, May 7, 1792, by British
merchants against three Rhode Island merchants on an account annexed
for 19,987 dollars; the defendant Casey set up in his plea the above
legislative resolve. 28 The judgment of the Court was rendered at the
same time as that in Barnes v. West and was to the effect that they
"were of the opinion, after mature deliberation on the plea of the
Defendants, that the plea of the defendants was insufficient to abate the
writ of the plaintiffs." Though no grounds for its decision were given
in the Court's judgment, the Rhode Island newspapers printed full
accounts of the reasons given by the Court. One said: "The Court also
determined in the case of Champion and Dickason against Silas Casey
that the Legislature of a State have no right to make a law to exempt
an individual from arrests, and his estate from attachments, for his
private debts, for any term of time, it being clearly a law impairing the
obligation of contracts, and therefore contrary to the Constitution of the
United States." Another newspaper stated that: "The defendant's
counsel pleaded a resolution of the State in bar of the action, by which
he was allowed three years to pay his debts and during which he was to
be free from arrests on that account. The Judges were unanimously
of opinion, that, as by the Constitution of the United States, the indivi-
dual States are prohibited from making laws which shall impair the
obligation of contracts, and as the resolution in question, if operative,
would impair the obligation of the contract in question, therefore it
could not be admitted to bar the action.
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Though this decision was given great publicity in the newspapers
throughout the States, it seems to have aroused no opposition to the
Federal Courts, and not only was there no public challenge of the deci-
arranging his books and papers and preparing them for a settlement, but he finds
his accounts so extensive and his credits so peculiarly situated that it -will require
great attention, application and time to bring them to a close with advantage to
himself and creditors, be impossible ever to complete that object, while he is
subject to the demands which an apprehension of a change in his circumstances
naturally urge unless therefore he can obtain indulgence from your Honors to
attend the settlement of his accounts without interruption, himself and family will
not only be greatly distressed, but his Creditors loose many advantages which such
an opportunity would afford, he therefore most respectfully solicits the inter-
position of this Honorable Assembly, and that they would extend to him the term
of three years for the above purpose, and that in the meantime he be exempted
from all arrests and attachments." On this petition, the Legislature had passed
a Resolve as follows: "It is voted and resolved that the prayer of this petition
be and the same is hereby granted."
'See original record in Champion and others v. Silas Casey and others, Novem-
ber Term 1792, United States Circuit Court District of Rhode Island, now in the
files of United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island.
" For these reports of the decision, see Columbian Centinel, June 20, 1792; Provi-
dence Gazette, June 16, 1792; United States Chronicle (Prov.) June 14, 1792;
Salem Gazette (Mass.) June 26, 1792; New York Daily Advertiser, June 22,
1792; Connecticut Journal, June 22, 1792; and see many other newspapers of that
date.
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sion but it was explicitly accepted by the Rhode Island Legislature,
whose acquiescence was expressed formally (as described by contempo-
rary papers) as follows: "In conformity to a decision of the Circuit
Court, the Lower House of Assembly voted on Wednesday that they
would not grant to any individual an exemption from arrests and attach-
ments for his private debts, for any term of time."
30
It thus appears that though, thirty years later, the right of the Federal
Courts to declare a State statute to be invalid was hotly attacked by
State after State in the Union, the exercise of this right, in 1792, was
accepted without protest, even in the very State which, five years earlier,
had sought to impeach its State judges for exercising the same right.
The episode is illuminating on the question of this alleged "usurped"
power of the Courts. A careful study of the history of the periods
from 1789 to 1819, from 1845 to i86o, and from 1865 to 1871, will show
that each political party, Federalist and Anti-Federalist, Democrat and
Whig, Democrat and Republican, upheld the power of the Court, when
the Court's decision, whether in favor of or against the validity of the
statute, coincided with the political views of that party on the question
involved in the case; and each challenged the Court's power on many
occasions when its decision was contrary to those political views. In
other words, opposition to the right of judicial review was not a judicial
or constitutional doctrine or political tenet consistently maintained by
any particular party; it was purely an opportunist, partisan manoeuvre,
which each political party was willing to advocate and employ to serve
its political ends.
"' One month before this decision, the Federal Circuit Court sitting in Pennsyl-
vania (Judges Wilson, Blair, and District judge Peters) had decided a case involv-
ing the validity of a statute of that State; but had held it not violative of the
Federal Constitution. See Collet v. Collet (1792) 2 Dall. 294; Gazette of the
United States, May 2, 1792; New York Daily Advertiser, May 2, 1792.
It is interesting to note that a similar constitutional question arose the next
year, 1793, in the Federal Circuit Court in Connecticut, but no decision was
rendered. See Connecticut Courant, Oct. .7, 1793. "The cause, which involves the
question whether a protection granted by the Legislature of the State to a person
who had a petition for an insolvent Act depending before them, (which protection
was to continue no longer than during the session) was valid and sufficient to
protect his person from an arrest by process or execution from the Courts of the
United States, was fully debated upon demurrer, but is continued. . . . This cause
involves consequences of iminense magnitude, and we trust will not be decided
without full deliberation." This case has not hitherto been noted.
